Recent use of digital technologies

The focus group was initiated with the question:

When was the last time you used a digital technology to communicate, what was it, who was it with , how many people were involved and how did you perceive the experience in terms of community?

Anthony had used email several minutes before the focus group convened, to contact a girlfriend and Daz used a mobile telephone 3 hours before to send a text message to a friend. Kevin had recently used Yahoo Messenger to discuss university work with other students, whilst Elaine had recently used Microsoft Messenger, Yahoo Messenger and Skype. Elaine asserted that she used the Internet more than a mobile telephone for communication, because the cost of an Internet connection was far less than the cost associated with mobile telephony and furthermore, Skype allowed unlimited calls without cost.

These responses exemplify the range of digital technologies in use and the extent to which they have diffused into everyday life.

Virtual community

There is a vast corpus of literature relating to the ‘virtual community’ debate. In order to synthesise ideas from this literature, an analytical framework rests on identification of an ideological line, which divides the debate into two classifications; on the one hand there are ‘optimists’ and the other ‘pessimists’. This framework is an ‘ideal type’, which serves to simplify a complex reality. Generally, this is conventionally how the debate has been organised: ‘Utopian rhetoric’, frequently associated with technological determinism, versus a more critical discourse (Dovey 1996:xiii).

Wellman and Gulia characterise the debate as one of ‘hope, hype, and reality’, one that is steeped in the duality that online interaction will ‘create wonderful new forms of community or will destroy community altogether’. They assert that more often than not, the participants of the debate, the ‘dueling dualists’, hold unequivocal and parochial views that reciprocally inflame and intensify the debate between the schools (Wellman & Gulia 1999:167). Barlow et al. for example go as far as to assert that

With the development of the Internet, and with the increasing pervasiveness of communication between networked computers, we are in the middle of the most transforming technological event since the capture of fire (Barlow et al. cited in Wellman & Gulia 1999:168).

In technological terms, Wellman and Gulia assert that a virtual community brings together social networks with computer networks, which they describe as ‘computer-supported social networks’, that may span large distances. Examples include electronic mail, bulletin board systems, newsgroups, Multi-User Dungeons and Internet Relay Chat (Wellman & Gulia 1999:169).

Rheingold’s ‘Virtual Community’ is often regarded as a key work in discussing virtual communities (Baym 1998:36). He traces the emergence of CMC and discusses his experiences of virtual communities from 1985, particularly in relation to Brand and Brilliant’s ‘WELL’ (Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link), a CMC system utilising conferencing software (Rheingold 1994; Rheingold 1994:40-41).

Rheingold defines virtual community as

social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace (Rheingold 1994:5).

This definition is revealing, although flawed, as he appears to evade responses to the questions: ‘how many are ‘enough people’?’, ‘what duration is ‘long enough’?’ and ‘how much and what types of ‘human feeling’ is sufficient?’.

However, Rheingold accurately captures some of the activities that are performed in a virtual community:

People […] use words on screens to exchange pleasantries and argue, engage in intellectual discourse, conduct commerce, exchange knowledge, share emotional support, make plans, brainstorm, gossip, feud, fall in love, find friends and lose them, play games, flirt, create a little high art and a lot of idle talk (Rheingold 1994:3).

de Souza and Preece refer to Preece who offers a far broader definition of virtual community than Rheingold, although in one sense, academically far superior and in doing so illustrates the problem of definition:

a group of people, who come together for a purpose online, and who are governed by norms and policies (de Souza & Preece 2004:580).

This definition has two advantages: it serves to encourage a balance of both technological and social issues and it can be applied to a range of communities, such as those that only exist online and those that also have ‘physical presence’ (de Souza & Preece 2004:580). Preece asserts that ‘[o]nline community means different things to different people’: For some it evokes a feeling of warmth and sharing, whilst for others, connotations of ‘conspiracy, subversive and criminal behavior, and invasion of privacy’ and for others, a threat, that may undermine or replace physical communities (Preece 2000:8-9).

Figure 1 illustrates the key elements of an online community and the primary factors that influence success (de Souza & Preece 2004:580). Preece asserts that an online community is constituted by four main elements. First, are people, who interact to satisfy needs or to perform roles such as leader or moderator (somebody who oversees an online community). Second, these individuals have a ‘shared purpose’, such as exchange of information, needs, interests or a service, which often underlies a community’s raison d'etre. Third, ‘policies’ that guide interaction, possibly in the form of regulation by rules, protocols, laws, rituals and ‘tacit assumptions’ or ‘norms’ for example. Fourth, ‘computer systems’, which are accessed by the user through software, which mediates interaction and allows a feeling of ‘togetherness’ (Preece 2000:10). This software includes synchronous applications such as chat rooms that operate in ‘real’ time and asynchronous systems such as email and bulletin board systems that involve delayed message exchanges (ibid. 2000:135-137).

Figure 1: Key components of an online community (Adapted from de Souza & Preece 2004:580).

de Souza and Preece assert that online communities are evolutionary and dynamic, perhaps in a similar manner to a physical community. They assert that the success of an online community is determined primarily by social factors, that is ‘sociability’ and assert that to an extent, inactive online locations illustrate that technology alone does not determine success, although software and usability play an important role (de Souza & Preece 2004:580).

Baym focuses on relationships of participants in virtual communities and the association between network and face-to-face communication. She asserts that early studies of CMC focused on ‘organizational uses of computing’, which often concluded that ‘computers are inherently inhospitable to social relationships’ (Baym 1998:35). She asserts that this is thematic of the introduction of new communication technologies. She refers to Kraut et al. and asserts that the telephone is one such innovation, where constituencies failed to realise the social importance at inception (Baym 2002:62). However, Baym argues that academia now holds the view that social relationships flourish online (Baym 1998:35). She asserts that Weise demonstrates that online interaction can promote a sense of belonging and provide support for needs that are unfulfilled by physical circumstances. At the same time, this illustrates ‘a dominant concern underlying most criticism of on-line community’, which is that it substitutes for physical, ‘geographically local’ community and for some, functions as a poor substitute, as it is communication oriented and thus negates the multiple functions of community (ibid. 1998:36).

Baym asserts that often, key criticisms are the homogenous nature of online communities and deficient commitment. Many online communities are organised around a central purpose founded on interests and therefore, diversity is limited as union is based on similarities. Baym refers to Healy and points out that commitment and diversity can be avoided with a ‘mere click’. These points appear to reveal significant differences between online and offline community, as an individual cannot withdraw from the latter so easily or with such speed (Baym 1998:36). Furthermore, homogeneity is intrinsic, as the majority of the world’s population do not have Internet access and it can be seen from Figure 2 that advanced regions dominate, therefore shaping the nature of the Internet and so presumably the nature of online communities. For example, of the 605.6 million people that accessed the Internet in 2002, only 6.31 million reside in Africa , that is 1% of total (Nua 2002:1).

Figure 2: Worldwide Internet access by region (millions). Source: Adapted from Nua ‘How Many Online?’ survey 2002 (Nua 2002:1).

Baym refers to Andersen and asserts some analysts have proposed that any community which is established beyond face-to-face interaction, is imagined, united by the mass media. She continues and asserts that, as opposed to asking whether ‘on-line communities are authentic’, a methodological shift in some CMC scholarship has led to a focus on (Baym 1998:38) ‘the style in which they are imagined’ (Andersen cited in Baym 1998:38). She asserts that this style is shaped by ‘preexisting structures’ such as ‘external contexts, temporal structure, system infrastructure, group purposes, and participant characteristics’. She argues that during ongoing online interaction, individuals exploit these structures in a strategic discourse that results in a dynamic constellation of meanings, which offer participants the opportunity to imagine membership of a community. Paramount to this is group expression, relationships, identities and norms (Baym 1998:38).

Baym asserts that all interaction is rooted in ‘multiple external contexts’ and an implication is that physical community and its online counterpart are inextricably linked. For example, online interaction is shaped by language, social practice and an understanding of external community and this provides a starting point for interaction. Baym draws on a three year ethnographic study of ‘r.a.t.s’ (rec.arts.tv.soaps), a Usenet newsgroup that discusses soap operas and asserts that members use preexisting ‘practices of soap fandom’, based on the cultural milieu of fans (Baym 1998:40-42). One aspect of ‘temporal structure’ is that message posting is organised in relation to programme transmission times and this suggests that norms are directly associated with ‘external’ physical contexts (ibid. 1998:43-44).

She also argues that ‘system infrastructure’ such as the usability of computer network systems, the number of nodes, geographical spread and transmission speed, affect online interaction. One often cited aspect of this is reduced ‘nonverbal’ or physical cues and Baym asserts that early study of this concluded that CMC was ‘a socially-impaired space’, but, however, she argues that imaginative alternatives have emerged such as ‘emoticons’ that facilitate expression (Baym 1998:44). However, this is problematic, as according to research performed by Trade Partners UK, up to 94% of face-to-face communication is based on body language, which contextualises verbal exchanges and this raises a question of the extent that online techniques can substitute for this (Trade Partners UK cited in Government News Network 2003:1). Technological developments such as the proliferation of broadband and introduction of services such as IP video (Internet Protocol video), VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) ( Tratz-Ryan & Kish 2005:2-3) and development of free peer to peer telephony services such as ‘Skype’ (Skype 2005:1), that allows telephone conferencing, suggest a possibility of improving online communication, as there is a potential to allow transmission of physical nuances that may enrich interaction. For example, video chat, using software such as ‘Eyeball Chat’ allows both aural and visual cues (Eyeballchat.com 2005:1).

Baym demonstrates that whilst CMC is founded within an offline framework, often, purposes emerge from the online interaction itself. For example, she asserts that the original purpose of the communication, soap opera discussion in this case, extends to topics about life in general, discussed in a personal context. In turn, to ‘those who engage in this personal talk over extended periods of time, maintaining friendships and acquaintances becomes another purpose of the interaction’ (Baym 1998:46-47). This implies development of an emotional bonding, a ‘strong tie’, indeed one that may not be accessible in a physical community. Similarly, shared interests that can be fulfilled online may never manifest in a locality, as a ‘soap opera club’ for example.

Baym asserts that a determinant of social uses of CMC is the characteristics of participants, particularly their perception of the media and ability to use it. Furthermore, she asserts that a feeling of community is more likely to develop with highly sociable participants (Baym 1998:47-48). She continues and asserts that different participants bring diverse resources, skills and other knowledge to the communication. This exemplifies Lévy’s notion of ‘collective intelligence’. Provenzo considers Lévy’s work and asserts that intelligence shared through networks, signals a shift from a ‘Cartesian model of thought’, ‘cogito’, that is ‘I think’, to ‘cogitamus’, ‘we think’ and he asserts that the networked computer enables this (Lévy 1997:xi). Lévy asserts that the ‘electronic agora’ could be a luxury reserved for the best educated and wealthiest. However, increased access could be achieved by recycling multimedia computers, connecting them through existing infrastructure, continuing improvements in usability of digital technologies and promoting access as a basic right (ibid. 1997:62-63). Provenzo asserts that Lévy’s message is that the computerisation of society enables promotion of ‘intelligent communities’ (ibid. 1997:xi) and Lévy asserts that individuals of the ‘knowledge space’, who interact with a broad range of communities, undergo a permanent transformation that results in the development of self-knowledge within a framework of group thought and collective knowledge, leading to the development of a ‘distinct sense of community’ (ibid. 1997:16-17). This highlights an evolutionary process of community development facilitated by network technology (ibid. 1997:vii-viii).

Baym emphasises that communicative interaction (Baym 1998:51), which can be defined as styles and methods of information sharing (Bucic 2002:16), is the ‘primary (and arguably the only) characteristic on- and off-line communities share’ (Baym 1998:51). For Baym, a fundamental, shared attribute of online and offline community is that, during interaction, social meanings are created by individual exploitation or ‘appropriation’ of resources and rules that preexisting structures offer (ibid. 1998:38,50-51). She asserts that online participants do this by exploring expressive communication, developing identities to create distinct relationships and producing social norms. If these features stabilise to ‘group-specific understandings’ then participants can imagine themselves as members of a community (ibid. 1998:51,62).

In a similar manner to Baym, Wellman and Gulia compare the features of virtual and physical communities in an attempt to establish continuities and discontinuities and support their argument with knowledge of networks within physical communities (Wellman & Gulia 1999:170). They assert that contemporary communities in developed societies are heterogeneous, ‘multiple communities’, based on neighbourhoods, family, groups and friends (ibid.1999:183) and within these communities, individuals seek different support with a ‘portfolio’ of specialised relationships (ibid.1999:171). Similarly, the Internet encourages a multiplicity of ties, primarily based on interests, although, the relative ease of communication enables all-embracing communities (ibid.1999:187). They assert that generally, specialised relationships appear to be the norm online and to an extent this reflects the characteristics of physical communities. Perhaps a significant difference is that online exchanges often involve individuals that are unknown to each other in a mutual discourse of ‘belonging’, sharing information, companionship and support (ibid.1999:171,175). Wellman & Gulia refer to Garton and Wellman and assert that these ‘weak ties’ are encouraged by the fact that many forms of online communication transmit limited ‘status’ and ‘situational cues’, such as information about gender, race, age, lifestyle and economic status (ibid.1999:176). Apparently in contrast to Baym, they assert that this can promote diversity, as ties are mediated by interests rather than similarities of identity (ibid.1999:184-185). However, weak ties can limit an individual’s motivation to support others and exchange information, as this may not be reciprocated, whereas in a physical community, structures of relationships can enforce pressure to reciprocate. However, they refer to Hiltz et al. and maintain that there is considerable evidence that reciprocation occurs ‘even between weak ties’ and assert that this can be accounted for in terms of an expression of identity, where helping others can develop their respect, promote self-esteem and status (ibid.1999:177). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that a personal philosophy of ‘help and be helped’ will, at a time of need, encourage accelerated and widespread support (ibid.1999:178).

They assert that the extent to which participants perceive their experience as ‘community’ can be revealed by consideration of the ‘strong, intimate ties that are the core of community’. They refer to Perlman and Fehr as well as Blumstein and Kollock and assert that these relationships include characteristics such as ‘specialness’ of the relationship, intimacy, ‘voluntary investment’, ‘desire for companionship’ and intense frequency of ‘meeting’, in different contexts and across a substantial time frame. Often, relationships are not purely mediated online and participants of an offline relationship may use the Internet as one method of communication. In contrast, a relationship may be purely mediated online (Wellman & Gulia 1999:178-179).

Wellman and Gulia challenge the belief that virtual communities withdraw people from physical communities. They assert that strong ties can be maintained both online and offline and they underline the idea that face-to-face communities are often sustained through telephony and demonstrate that predominantly, communities in advanced countries, do not feature regular face-to-face exchanges. To an extent, this illustrates a significant continuity between online and offline communities. Furthermore, they emphasise relationships rather than the source of mediation and assert that many do not compartmentalise offline and online life (Wellman & Gulia 1999:181-182). They refer to Walther and argue that increased online interaction is likely to lead to development of these relationships through other communication forms and face-to-face meetings. So, just as face-to-face ties are sustained through email or mobile telephony for example, online ties can be developed through face-to-face meetings (ibid.1999:182-183).

In dramatic contrast to the views above, Robins, who sees the virtual in a similar way to Lévy, although from a ‘Stollian’, pessimistic standpoint and concentrating on political economy, broadens the debate by asserting that, the ‘real world […] in which virtual communities are now being imagined [is primarily characterised by] difference, asymmetry and conflict. […] Not community’ (Robins 1996:24). Robins and Webster agree with Sivanandan who asserts that virtual communities are not communities of people, but communities of interests (Robins & Webster 1999:232) and as such Robins argues that virtual space is the domain of withdrawal, refuge and order (Robins 1996:25).

With the ‘oppressive legacy’ of economic liberalism promoted by Reagan and Thatcher, politicians sought political and social cohesion and this was facilitated by a marriage of the principles and philosophy of ‘communitarianism’ with information and communications technologies, resulting in what Robins and Webster describe as a ‘new techno-communitarianism’ (Robins and Webster 1999:230-231). Robins refers to Young who asserts that communitarianism is representative of a drive to unity and is created artificially through technology and cyberspace, which encourages alignment of individuals. He asserts that consensus and transparency is a ‘communitarian myth’, imagined on a global scale. He refers to Moscovici and asserts that ‘techno-community’ in cyberspace stands for a place of order, which ‘has no basis in reality’, as a social system is only feasible if it is disordered (Robins 1996: 22-23). Robins and Webster characterise virtual community as a ‘retreat’ or a safe haven, another world, free from conflict and antagonism, a ‘neutralisation of politics’ replaced by a ‘politics of membership and shared interests’ (Robins and Webster 1999:231-232). They refer to Lévy and assert that, whilst he is aware of capitalist control of network systems, he persists with his vision of a new social order of ‘collective intelligence’, which appears to conflict with capitalist aims (ibid. 1999:223). They continue and characterise Lévy’s view as misguided idealism, where online participants are connected with similar conditions to face-to-face interaction and conflict is resolved (ibid 1999:223). So, it might be concluded that Robins and Webster hold the view that any notion of virtual community is misplaced. Although both Robins and Webster can indeed be seen to overstate their case, presumably as a rhetorical device, they present a valuable perspective that serves to counterbalance the array of utopian assumptions about virtual community.

Identity

Donath asserts that ‘[i]dentity plays a key role in virtual communities’ (Donath 1999:29). Identity encompasses the features of an individual’s character and ‘what is meaningful to them’. Components of identity include social class, gender and ethnicity for example (Giddens 2001:691). Donath asserts that as communication is primary in online discourse, ascertaining the identity of interactants is central ‘for understanding and evaluating an interaction’. She argues that identity is grounded, in the physical world, by the body and this changes in a virtual setting, because information replaces matter. She asserts that online identities are multiple and varied, although she adds that there is always a link back to ‘the body at the keyboard’ (Donath 1999:29).

Thinking about the virtual

Lévy asserts that reality ‘implies a material embodiment, a tangible presence’, that is an entity exists with clearly defined limits (Lévy 1998:23,34). In other words, it is ‘the material objectivity of the world, the reality ‘which everybody can clearly see’’.

However, he views this as dynamic and implies that imagination produces a subjective reality that is socially constructed (Lévy 2001 a:1). Lévy emphasises a reconstitution of reality, created collectively and based on electronic networks: ‘ We are all in the process of thinking within the same network’ (Lévy 2001 a:3).

In etymological terms, the word ‘virtual’ can be traced to ‘virtualis’, which evolved from ‘virtus’, meaning power or strength (Lévy 1998:23). According to Shields, conceptions of the virtual have a long and often bloody history, inextricably tied to interpretations of reality, including theological conflict pivoting on an exegesis of the Christian Eucharist, a dichotomy arising from whether transubstantiation of bread ‘into a piece of the body of Christ occurred literally’, a real phenomena or was rooted in symbolism, a virtual phenomena (Shields 2003:1,5-6).

According to Shields, dictionary definitions of ‘virtual’ embrace everyday understandings of the term, as ‘that which is so in essence but not actually so’, implying a reality, but not one that is ‘concrete’. Another strand of ‘virtual’ relates to ‘virtue’, a personal (Shields 2003:2-3) embodiment of the ‘power of operative influence inherent in a supernatural or divine being’ (Oxford English Dictionary cited in Shields 2003:3). This implies a differential between the potential morality of an individual’s ‘actual existence’ and the realisation of this in relation to a moral ideal (Shields 2003:3).

A tripartite division of conceptual views can be seen vis-à-vis the virtual and CMC.

Rheingold appears to believe that the virtual is an extension of reality. In a sense, this is exemplified by his reflection that the ‘screen became a kind of reality, an extension of my mind’ (Rheingold 1998:1). However, he implies that this extension is an ‘illusion’ by describing a virtual reality system as an immersion ‘in an artificial world’ (Rheingold 1991:16). He asserts that

Nobody mistakes virtual life for real life, even though it has an emotional reality to many’ and ‘[p]eople in virtual communities do just about everything people do in real life, but we leave our bodies behind (Rheingold 1994:3,16).

This appears to reinforce his view that virtual life is an extension of reality, highlighting an emotional connection with reality.

Another view of the virtual seemingly dismisses any notion of this extension. Stoll describes the virtual as a ‘poor substitute’ for real life, an ‘unreal universe, a soluble tissue of nothingness’, a ‘nonplace’ (Stoll 1995:4). Slouka echoes this with a similarly pessimistic vision and talks of a ‘virtual dream’ (Slouka 1995:22).

In sharp contrast, Lévy offers another perspective that conceptualises the virtual as inseparable from reality. He asserts that

The virtual, strictly defined, has little relationship to that which is false, illusory, or imaginary. The virtual is by no means the opposite of the real. On the contrary, it is a fecund and powerful mode of being that expands the process of creation, opens up the future, injects a core of meaning beneath the platitude of immediate physical presence (Lévy 1998:16).

From Lévy’s philosophical standpoint, the virtual means potential existence rather than ‘actual’ existence. He offers a biological example, asserting that ‘a tree is virtually present in its seed’. ‘Actualisation’ is the growth from seed to tree, that is, the process of virtual to actual. So, Lévy views virtuality and actuality as ‘nothing more than two different modes of reality’ (Lévy 2001 b:29-30). Thus, counterintuitively, rather than the virtual signifying ‘unreality’, expressed in the diametric of virtual and real, his typology polarises the virtual with the actual (ibid. 2001 b:29).

Lévy refers to Serres and identifies one aspect of the virtual as ‘not-there’. That is to say, dissociation with ‘there’, the ‘here and now’ of the actual (Lévy 1998:179). ‘Not-there’ is exemplified by the cyberspace which mediates a telephone conversation. The virtual also includes memory, imagination, knowledge and religion (ibid. 1998:28), ‘real ideations’ that are intangible and virtual. Shields asserts that the ‘virtual is always real’, but is only actualised through human intervention which transposes the virtual to a ‘tangible’ thing (Shields 2003:38-39).

Lévy describes the virtual as a ‘problematic complex’, a suspended cluster of potential outcomes that ‘accompanies a situation, event, object, or entity’, which in turn brings about a process of actualisation, that is resolution of this ‘knot of tendencies’ into actual, concrete terms (Lévy 1998:24,179). For example, a problem for the seed is growth to a tree and during this process the form of the tree will resolve depending upon the seed’s properties and circumstances (Lévy 1998:24). So, actualisation manifests as a solution, exterior to the problem, a new creation, a ‘transformation of ideas, a true becoming that feeds the virtual in turn’. The reciprocation to the virtual can be described as ‘virtualisation’, ‘actualization in reverse’ (ibid. 1998:25-26), that is, the process of actual to virtual, a transformation from the act, the ‘here and now’ to a problem (ibid. 1998:174). So, virtualisation is a shift in ‘identity’ of an entity, temporarily and perhaps permanently displacing the actualised solution, in favour of problems redefined, new questions, that is to say, there is a reconsideration of the ‘general question to which [the entity] responds’. In turn, the informed entity is oriented and actualised, ‘redefining the initial actuality’, an evolution. Presumably, for the seed, the nature of growth of the tree (actual identity) is relayed back to its nerve centre (process of virtualisation) and new questions are raised in relation to the original problem, that is growth of seed to tree and in turn, a process of actualisation solidifies the resolutions and the process is repeated (ibid. 1998:26).

To contextualise this, in terms of the web, hypertext is essentially virtual, until actualised through a process of user request and server/client delivery to screen (Lévy 2001 b:55). A digitalised message exchange that is part of a human to human network dialogue can be described as follows. Hypertext is actualised on screen, the text is read through interpretation, continuing actualisation as an appropriation of knowledge (Lévy 1998:47-50). During this process, memory is used, which relates to virtualisation (ibid. 1998:28). To an extent, Shields illustrates this with the assertion that

Thought takes us beyond the present moment of the actual, not only to abstract ideas but to general problematics, to the historical and to the realm of principle, all of which are virtual (Shields 2003:32).

In turn, cognition would output thought to memory, which is actualised into text and virtualised as a form of hypertext, by input to computer and transmission across a network, where it is temporarily suspended, virtually occupying ‘every point in the network’. The message then becomes actualised on the recipient’s screen and the process repeats (Lévy 1998:28,50,56). In this process, individuals’ perceived reality can be seen to change, somehow in parallel with the messages exchanged. That is to say for example, that a virtual community mediates interaction and in turn ‘relations reconfigure themselves’. This appears to be a similar process to a face-to-face dialogue, although the modus operandi differs, for example, geographical space does not form the basis of or limit a virtual community, that is, ‘[s]ynchronisation replaces spatial unity’ (ibid.1998 29-30). As Nip puts it, the Internet’s characteristics of

interconnectivity and interactivity are considered to reconfigure time and space, and in turn this reconfigures the individual and networks of relationships (Nip 2004:410).

So, the difference of modes is primarily characterised as a redistribution of ‘spatiotemporal coordinates’ and in everyday life, there may be both a physical and logical switching of interactive configurations, leaps ‘from network to network, from one system of proximity to the next’ (Lévy 1998:26-27,31).

Community

Words have meanings: some words, however, also have a ‘feel’. The word ‘community’ is one of them (Bauman 2001:1).

Preece discusses the difficulty of defining community, asserting that ‘for years, sociologists have defined and redefined the concept’ (Preece 2000:14). She refers to Abercrombie who asserts that the term ‘is one of the most illusive in sociology’ (ibid. 2000:175). Baym agrees and refers to Fernback who asserts that

Community is a term which seems readily definable to the general public but is infinitely complex and amorphous in academic discourse (Baym 1998:35).

Preece asserts that prior to the industrial revolution, space determined communities, which were highly integrated and self-sustaining (Preece 2000:175). Wellman and Gulia assert that with technological development, in the first instance relating to the telephone, aeroplane and automobile, contemporary sociologists have reconceptualised ‘community’, emphasising dispersed social networks rather than geographical proximity (Wellman & Gulia 1999:169), highlighting that individuals satisfy their needs by membership of ‘multiple communities’ (Preece 2000:15).

Network analysis is one way to unfold the notion of community. Here, sociologists study networks of relationships (Preece 2000:173). In this discourse, a ‘group’ is viewed as a network, characterised by a high intensity of interconnection and according to Preece, a group can only be described as a community if its elements ‘share important resources, provide social support, and show reciprocity’. Preece refers to Granovetter and distinguishes between the ‘strong ties’ that weave these meaningful relationships together and ‘weak ties’, characterised by less shared resources and limited interdependence, particularly in emotional terms. She asserts that an individual may have hundreds of weak ties and a few strong ties (ibid. 2000:174).

Baym’s analysis underlines the problematic nature of defining ‘community’ and hence its controversial status in academia, as it is ‘loaded’ with ‘normative and ideological connotations’ (Baym 1998:35-36). Although there appears to be a trend in the literature emphasising strengths of relationships (Preece 2000:18), Baym refers to Doheny-Farina who contradicts this and in doing so illustrates the complexity of definition. He asserts that

A community is bound by place, which always includes complex social and environmental necessities. It is not something you can easily join. You can’t subscribe to a community as you subscribe to a discussion group on the net. It must be lived. It is entwined, contradictory, and involves all our senses (Baym 1998:37).

Rheingold refers to Oldenburg and asserts that there are three essential places in an individual’s life: home, work and places to ‘gather for conviviality’. He asserts that many of the ‘third places’ in contemporary society, such as cafes, pubs and town squares, have been superseded by shopping malls and fast food outlets for example and with this the ‘social fabric of existing communities’ has eroded (Rheingold 1994:25).

Another perspective concentrates on ‘imagined community’. Feenberg and Bakardjieva refer to Andersen, discuss the imaginary and assert that the virtual is a normal feature of community, ‘regardless of the nature of the medium on which it relies’. They assert that the ‘great sacred communities of the past’ were mediated by and imagined through text and language and they trace the emergence of imagined communities of ‘nations’ to the newspaper and novel (Feenberg & Bakardjieva 2004:37-38). Poster agrees and asserts that ‘old media’ such as newspapers, united a nation by weaving a common thread through it and in asserting this, indicates that the ‘imaginary’ is fundamental to any community (Poster 1995:7). Feenberg and Bakardjieva refer to Mcluhan and Maffesoli respectively and assert that broadcasting reconfigured the imaginary and a trend towards customisation and demassification has promoted a diversity of subcultures or ‘neo-tribes’. The latest development is imagined communities underpinned by hypertext exchange (Feenberg & Bakardjieva 2004:37-38). Poster contends that discussion of ‘virtual communities’ often interpret their success as a signal of the demise of ‘real’ communities and although this may be the case, in considering ‘virtual’ or online communities, ‘the opposition “virtual” and “real” community contains serious difficulties’ (Poster 1995:7).